

TEN FOR TAIWAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Taiwan is a cornerstone of the global economy and a vital partner of the United States. Despite never having exercised control over Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) asserts a historical claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and continually threatens to “reunify” it with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), by force if necessary.

The CCP’s increasingly aggressive approach toward Taiwan threatens peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, violates the expectations which underpin U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan, and requires the United States to reinforce our commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.

The CCP’s aggressive behavior damages peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and raises serious concerns about the prospect of outright military aggression toward Taiwan, including an invasion. Therefore, it is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States to deter an act of military aggression from the PRC toward Taiwan.

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) has examined this issue in detail and has made the following key findings, which provide a blueprint for Congressional action:

1. **The United States needs additional long-range missiles and unmanned vehicles in the Indo-Pacific region and the U.S. defense manufacturing base is not postured to quickly produce the needed numbers.**
 2. **The United States and its allies need to strengthen and better coordinate collective planning** for how they will deter or would respond diplomatically and economically to a crisis over Taiwan.
 3. **Improving combined training** between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries will bolster deterrence.
 4. **Taiwan urgently needs key U.S. weapons systems** already approved by Congress for sale.
 5. **The United States does not currently have a clearly defined operational command and control** structure for contingency response in the Indo-Pacific.
 6. **U.S. critical infrastructure is vulnerable** to CCP cyberattacks.
 7. **Taiwan faces consistent CCP cyber-attacks** and remains vulnerable in the cyber domain.
 8. **U.S. and Taiwanese forces do not currently plan or operate in an integrated manner.**
 9. **U.S. bases in the theater should be strengthened** against the possibility of PLA attack.
 10. **Resupplying Taiwan would be difficult in the event of a crisis.**
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WHY TAIWAN MATTERS

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) was formed at the beginning of the 118th Congress in order to “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States.” Central to this mandate is deterring CCP military aggression against Taiwan. As the Select Committee moves forward with its important work, it will undertake additional efforts to investigate military, economic, diplomatic, and other means for assisting Taiwan in its efforts to increase its strength and resilience in the face of continued CCP aggression.

A thriving island democracy roughly 100 miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan is a cornerstone of the global economy and a vital partner of the United States. It is our 8th largest trading partner and the source of 92 percent of the world’s highest-end semiconductors. It also is the centerpiece of the first island chain, a string of countries, including Japan to its north and the Philippines to its south, that together represent an essential line of defense against the CCP’s increasingly aggressive use of its military forces. Taiwan’s democracy, however, lives under constant CCP threats of military aggression, economic embargo, and political subversion.

Despite never having exercised control over Taiwan, the CCP has maintained a historical claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and continually threatens to “reunify” it with the PRC, by force if necessary. As the tragic toll of the war in Ukraine demonstrates, in the case of armed CCP aggression, the Taiwanese people would pay a terrible price and their democracy would hang in the balance.

Should a CCP invasion or other attack happen, the American people would also pay a price. Global markets would crater, likely by at least \$2 trillion, plunging the United States and countries around the world into economic crisis.¹ The world’s supply of semiconductors – which power a significant percentage of the American economy – would be devastated, depriving Americans of the ability to maintain our critical infrastructure, innovate in transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence, and produce airplanes, cars, and agricultural machinery.² According to one recent study, an attack on Taiwan by the PRC could “increase the risks of a global economic recession, sustained inflation, widespread sovereign

¹ Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon, “The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict,” Rhodium Group (December 14, 2022).

² BCG and SIA, “Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era,” April 2021.

defaults, rising unemployment, and potential social unrest.”³ This makes deterrence vital to America’s national interest.

In the event of CCP military aggression against Taiwan, American servicemembers in the Western Pacific would be put at severe risk. Taiwan is a lynchpin of America’s ability to defend its allies, particularly Japan and the Philippines. Should Taiwan fall under the PRC’s control, it could cause allies to doubt America’s security commitments, a core objective of the CCP. Control of Taiwan would also provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with favorable geographic position to interdict U.S. support to other allies in the region. As a CCP handbook for mid-career PLA officers puts it, “As soon as Taiwan is reunified with mainland China, Japan’s maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China’s fighters and bombers.”⁴

According to the Taiwan Relations Act, which since 1979 has been the cornerstone of U.S. partnership with Taiwan, it is the policy of the United States to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”⁵ The law further states that it is our policy “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”⁶ The CCP’s increasingly aggressive approach toward Taiwan threatens peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and violates the expectations which underpin U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. Therefore, it is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States to deter an act of military aggression from the PRC toward Taiwan.

BACKGROUND

Since Xi Jinping’s assumption of power over a decade ago, the CCP has steadily escalated its pressure campaign against Taiwan. Following the election of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, the CCP has further stepped up its pressure, including by coaxing and coercing ten countries into isolating Taiwan by flipping their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, leaving Taiwan with just 13 diplomatic partners.⁷ The PRC has also punished countries who upgrade unofficial ties with Taiwan, such as its economic pressure on Lithuania following

³ Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon, “The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict,” Rhodium Group (December 14, 2022).

⁴ Tanner Greer, “Losing Taiwan Means Losing Japan,” *The Scholar’s Stage* (February 26, 2020), <https://scholars-stage.org/losing-taiwan-means-losing-japan>.

⁵ Taiwan Relations Act

⁶ *Ibid*

⁷ Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (March 31, 2023), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275>.

the country's decision to allow the opening of a de facto Taiwan embassy.⁸ PRC authorities have even taken steps to effectively ban many of Taiwan's top agricultural exports under dubious grounds.⁹

Beijing has also attempted to block Taiwan's rightful participation in international bodies.¹⁰ Notably, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the PRC blocked Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly, a decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO) responsible for coordinating international cooperation on the pandemic.¹¹ In so doing, it cynically deprived the world of the opportunity to benefit from the best practices of Taiwan's world-class health system in its highly successful fight against the pandemic.

More recently, Taiwan has faced persistent military pressure from Beijing. Beginning in 2021, the number of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft violating Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) spiked, nearly doubling to 1,737 sorties in 2022.¹² Director of Central Intelligence William Burns has warned that while an invasion of Taiwan is not inevitable, he "wouldn't underestimate President Xi's ambitions with regard to Taiwan," and that Xi has "instructed the People's Liberation Army ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion."

Beijing reserves its harshest actions for perceived slights, particularly any collaboration with the United States. In response to then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taiwan, the PLA performed a large-scale military exercise in the waters surrounding the island. The size and scale of this exercise was comparable and in some cases surpassed that of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995-1996. That same month also saw a record 446 PLA aircraft enter Taiwan's ADIZ, including 302 violations of the cross-Strait Median Line, which the CCP had previously respected for decades as the line demarcating PRC and Taiwanese waters. The PLA additionally launched long-range rockets and

⁸ Helen Davidson, "China's trade halt with Lithuania over Taiwan ties sends warning to Europe," *The Guardian* (August 25, 2021), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/26/chinas-trade-halt-with-lithuania-over-taiwan-ties-sends-warning-to-europe>.

⁹ Russell Hsiao, "China Ramps Up Economic Coercion on Taiwan Ahead of 2024 Elections," *Global Taiwan Institute* (April 19, 2023), <https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/04/china-ramps-up-economic-coercion-on-taiwan-ahead-of-2024-elections/>.

¹⁰ Wang Kwo-tsai, "Why ICAO needs Taiwan," *The Diplomat* (September 14, 2022) <https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/why-icao-needs-taiwan/>.

¹¹ "Taiwan fails in bid to join WHO assembly after China pressure," *Reuters* (May 23, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-efforts-join-who-assembly-fail-2022-05-23/>.

¹² Gerald Brown and Ben Lewis, "Taiwan ADIZ Violations" (accessed on April 24, 2023), <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit#gid=2015900050>.

ballistic missiles into multiple demarcated zones to the island's north, east, and south, at least four of which flew directly over Taiwan.¹³

A similar story played out following President Tsai Ing-wen's meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, CA on April 5. Three days of military drills surrounding Taiwan saw a significant presence of aircraft including 54 violations of Taiwan's ADIZ on April 10. Numerous systems of aircraft were involved including both advanced fighter jets and nuclear-capable bombers.¹⁴ The exercise also simulated for the first time strikes on Taiwan by aircraft carrier-based fighters and included drills simulating maritime blockades, a tactic which could choke off global access to critical technology supply chains centered in Taiwan.¹⁵

The CCP's behavior undermines peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and raises serious concerns about the prospect of outright military aggression toward Taiwan, including an invasion.

THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

The Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has examined these questions in detail. Members of the Committee, including Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, and Reps. Rob Wittman, Seth Moulton, John Moolenaar, Haley Stevens, Michelle Steele, Ritchie Torres, Ashley Hinson, and Carlos Gimenez, joined Speaker McCarthy for his California meeting with President Tsai. Later that month, the Select Committee held a tabletop exercise simulating a CCP invasion of Taiwan. While tabletop exercises are not necessarily determinative of real-world outcomes, the Select Committee used this exercise to better understand relative US strengths and vulnerabilities in a potential conflict. The Select Committee followed the exercise a week later with an expert roundtable to identify concrete steps the United States can take to strengthen deterrence.

The historic gathering at the Reagan Library marked the highest profile visit for any Taiwanese president since 1979. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to robust U.S.-Taiwan relations, with Speaker McCarthy expressing bipartisan congressional support for Taiwan. President Tsai warned that the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and the peace it has fostered faces "unprecedented challenges." Taiwan, she said, weathers persistent "cognitive warfare" from the CCP in the

¹³ China Power Project, "Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis," Center for Strategic and International Studies (August 5, 2022), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis>.

¹⁴ Gerald Brown and Ben Lewis, "Taiwan ADIZ Violations" (accessed on April 24, 2023), <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit#gid=2015900050>.

¹⁵ Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, "China ends Taiwan drills after practicing blockades, precision strikes," Reuters (April 10, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-following-chinas-taiwan-drills-with-great-interest-2023-04-10/>.

form of disinformation and constant psychological attacks intended to weaken Taiwan's self-confidence and political will so that the CCP can win without fighting.

Two weeks later, on April 19, 2023, members of the Select Committee gathered on Capitol Hill for a tabletop exercise simulating what could happen should those challenges turn into war. The exercise, led by the Center for a New American Security's Gaming Lab, simulated a CCP invasion of Taiwan in 2027 and sought to identify what the United States can do now to strengthen its diplomatic, economic, and military deterrent so that such a scenario never materializes. The game revealed dangerous shortcomings in Taiwan's hard power and its ability to sustain its self-defenses, as well as deep vulnerabilities in U.S. force posture, military capacity, economic statecraft, and allied commitment.

Following the tabletop exercise, the Select Committee hosted a roundtable discussion on Taiwan, focused on mobilizing policy tools to enhance deterrence against CCP aggression. The roundtable featured presentations from three outside speakers, Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn (Center for a New American Security), and Jimmy Goodrich (Semiconductor Industry Association), as well as written testimony from Dr. Oriana Skyler Mastro (American Enterprise Institute).

The testimony and discussion reaffirmed the key conclusions from the tabletop exercise.

First, preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.

Second, if we do not take urgent steps, the United States will likely be unready to deter an invasion of Taiwan.

Third, the United States must do more to build allied interoperability and international commitment for defending Taiwan's right to determine its own future by peaceful means and to shield Taiwan's current and prospective partners from PRC coercion.

Fourth, Taiwan needs additional U.S. military training and hard power capabilities.

Fifth, to strengthen deterrence, the United States must make substantial investments in critical capabilities, posture, and defense industrial base capacity.

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Ten for Taiwan: Key Findings and Recommendations for Strengthening Near-Term Deterrence

The Select Committee has identified ten bipartisan key findings and recommendations to help build a more credible deterrent when it comes to Taiwan. This is not an exhaustive list of everything that must be done to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Rather, this is what the Committee believes can get done in the 118th Congress in a bipartisan fashion.

1. Key Finding: The United States needs additional long-range missiles and unmanned vehicles in the Indo-Pacific region and the U.S. defense manufacturing base is not postured to quickly produce the needed numbers.

During the tabletop exercise, the United States ran out of critical munitions and ran low on all precision-guided missiles within a week. As Dr. Mastro pointed out in her submission to the Committee, we must jumpstart the munitions industrial base: “if we want our actions to serve as a deterrent, we have to do it now...not after China attacks.”¹⁶ Building and maintaining sufficient stockpiles of critical munitions is essential to deterring and denying a PLA attack. A failure to reach this threshold could undermine U.S. deterrence of the CCP. More broadly, to preserve the great power peace of the last 80 years, the U.S. should maintain its military superiority in all domains while deterring aggression.

Recommendation 1: Use multiyear procurements to rapidly increase the number of long-range strike assets in the theater.

To bolster deterrence and enhance U.S. and partner ability to hold at risk PLA maritime capabilities at range in the event of a PRC invasion of Taiwan, Congress should build on policy priorities included in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that seek to increase the purchase and stockpiling of critical munitions, such as Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs), Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs), Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs), MK-48 torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, and anti-radiation weapons by authorizing multiyear procurements extending up to 5 years. It should also include the systems required to launch them, including accelerating the modification of B-52 bombers to fire LRASMs and the continued modification of P-8s for the same purpose. Congress should also increase funding for sonobuoys and other anti-submarine warfare capabilities and for autonomous undersea and unmanned aerial vehicles for purposes of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and to increase the number and diversity of strike platforms. Lastly, Congress should expedite the development

¹⁶ “The Challenges of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Recommendations for U.S. Policy,” pg. 12.

and fielding of hypersonic weapons to present PLA forces with a more challenging and complex threat environment.

2. Key Finding: The United States and its allies need to strengthen and better coordinate collective planning for how they will deter or would respond diplomatically and economically to a crisis over Taiwan.

In the tabletop exercise, the U.S. side had to rapidly assemble a sanctions package without the benefit of fully consulting with U.S. allies. As a result, economic measures had a limited effect on CCP decision-making.

Recommendation 2: Develop joint plans with U.S. allies and partners to enact severe diplomatic and economic costs on the CCP in the event that it engages in military aggression against Taiwan.

Economic sanctions will be most effective if key allies such as G7, NATO, NATO+5, and Quad members join, and negotiating a joint response and broadcasting this message publicly has the added benefit of enhancing deterrence. Much like we do joint contingency planning for war fighting, we need to coordinate in peacetime with U.S. allies.”¹⁷ To that end, Congress should pass legislation similar to the STAND with Taiwan Act of 2023 that mandates the development of an economic sanctions package to be employed in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. It should also pass legislation to counter the CCP’s economic coercion, including by providing tools to support foreign partners targeted by the PRC’s economic coercion. The flip side of economic deterrence is economic engagement with Taiwan. Accordingly, Congress should support efforts to reduce the taxation burden on U.S.-Taiwan cross-border investment as well as broader trade negotiations with a particular focus on developing shared standards and regulations to combat the CCP’s unfair economic policies. The United States should strengthen the NATO Plus arrangement to include India. The United States should also strengthen diplomatic deterrence by supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and amending the TAIPEI Act to provide that the United States, alongside its allies and partners, should publicly oppose any attempts by the CCP to resolve the status of Taiwan’s sovereignty by intentionally misusing, misinterpreting, and misleading others on the underlying purpose of UN Resolution 2758 or the United States’ One China Policy.

¹⁷ “The Challenges of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Recommendations for U.S. Policy,” pg. 10.

3. Key Finding: Improving combined training between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries will bolster deterrence.

U.S. forces have integrated closely with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region through combined training and exercises, which builds trust and improves operational effectiveness. U.S. training of Ukraine's military since 2014 greatly improved its ability to turn back Russia's invasion in 2022. The lack of familiarity and interoperability between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries severely limits their combined combat effectiveness.

Recommendation 3: Expand combined military training between the United States and Taiwan.

The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to "establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan" and identified joint military exercises with Taiwan as important for improving military readiness. Congress should build on the FY 2023 language by promoting the expansion of combined training and exercises, including annual tabletop exercises and operational training with U.S. air, maritime, and special operations forces and U.S. National Guard units, to build trust, improve Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, and strengthen interoperability and integration in key operational areas. This expanded training should build towards shared tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as improved communications and data sharing. It should also recognize that U.S. special operations forces' partnerships that include Building Partner Capacity and Training are essential to further enhancing collaboration and security and should be strengthened with Taiwan. Plus, DoD's Joint Proponent for Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Coordinating Authority for Internet-based MISO must evolve to better counter strategic competitors like the CCP in the disinformation and hostile propaganda realms when it comes to Taiwan.

4. Key Finding: Taiwan urgently needs key U.S. weapons systems already approved by Congress for sale.

Taiwan's fielding of these weapons systems will significantly enhance its ability to deter a PLA attack.

Recommendation 4: Urgently provide Taiwan with essential hard power capabilities, including the military equipment and weapons it has already purchased.

Deliveries of missiles and weapons systems approved for sale to Taiwan have faced delays, often for years, creating a significant backlog that holds back Taiwan's ability to defend itself and weakens deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. To correct course, Congress should exercise its oversight authority by demanding quarterly updates on progress in reducing the backlog of foreign military sales (FMS) items while following up the authorization of foreign military financing (FMF) to Taiwan in FY2023 with appropriations providing grant assistance for the island democracy to acquire urgently needed capabilities. Congress can also assist by requiring the FMS and FMF sales, assistance, and deliveries to align with priority regions in the National Security and National Defense Strategies, prioritizing Taiwan for expedited receipt of certain purchased arms, including those consistent with the guidelines for FMS and FMF in the FY2023 NDAA. Finally, Congress should urge the Pentagon to draw on experience from the successful Harpoon land-based launch solution employed by Ukraine for Taiwan, including in fulfillment of already-approved FMS purchases or for Harpoon missiles currently slated for demilitarization by the U.S. Navy

5. Key Finding: The United States does not currently have a clearly defined operational command and control structure for contingency response in the Indo-Pacific.

Recommendation 5: Fully implement Sec. 1087 of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act by ensuring the establishment of a standing Joint Force Headquarters or Joint Task Force focused on crisis contingency command and control.

In a crisis, critical time could be lost adjudicating which organization or senior leader is in charge of the day-to-day conduct of various coalition operations. This type of planning should be done in peacetime, ideally with the inclusion of personnel from key allies like Japan and Australia.

The FY 2023 NDAA directed the establishment of a Joint Force Headquarters by October 1, 2024 to improve contingency command and control in the Indo-Pacific. There are concerns that the Department is executing the requirement through the establishment of what it calls Joint Task Force-Micronesia, a two-star command largely centered on Guam and surrounding islands. While establishing clear lines of authority for joint operations on Guam and surrounding areas is important, it is unclear if the Department is on track to resolve the problem that Congress intended to solve in Sec. 1087, which was about establishing a crisis response chain of command. Congress should require the Department to identify, within 180 days, the requirements for establishing a fully-equipped, empowered, and standalone Joint Force Headquarters or Joint Task Force in peacetime that

would be responsible for the operational employment of forces in the Western Pacific in the event of a conflict, and then to implement the original intent of Sec. 1087 with leadership of sufficient rank to command such an effort.

6. Key Finding: U.S. critical infrastructure is vulnerable to CCP cyberattacks.

U.S. critical infrastructure is central to both our economic health and military mobility. PLA hackers could target naval and aerial ports of embarkation to slow down our ability to send American forces to the theater, as well as shut down much of our nation's economic activity.

Recommendation 6: Enhance the cyber resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure, especially as it relates to national defense readiness.

Sec. 1259 of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the head of other pertinent federal agencies, to conduct a review of port-related infrastructure purchases and investments made by entities associated with the PRC. Congress should build on this language by focusing on improving cybersecurity at U.S. ports and protecting maritime port supply chains.

To address any vulnerabilities, Congress should enhance the ability of U.S. port infrastructure operators to secure their networks by explicitly allowing the Port Security Grant Program to cover costs associated with cybersecurity enhancements, including replacing PRC-origin software. Congress should also support Sector Risk Management Agencies as they work with air, rail, and other transportation infrastructure entities that are central to the flow of U.S. military forces during a crisis and the continuity of the American economy to improve their cybersecurity posture. Finally, the U.S. should ensure it is adequately testing and evaluating the security of the software, firmware, and hardware underpinning U.S. critical infrastructure.

7. Key Finding: Taiwan faces consistent CCP cyber-attacks and remains vulnerable in the cyber domain.

The CCP has trained its cyber-attack capabilities on Taiwan, which lacks the defense required to protect its infrastructure. Taiwan will struggle to defeat an invasion without the continual operation of its ports, airports, and other transportation facilities, as well as its power supplies and other critical infrastructure.

Recommendation 7: Help Taiwan strengthen its cybersecurity posture.

The United States can support Taiwan by passing the bipartisan Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act of 2023, which would conduct cybersecurity training, help defend Taiwan's military and critical infrastructure, leverage U.S. capabilities, and address ongoing cyber-attacks targeting Taiwan. The United States should also bolster efforts to work with Taiwan to provide cyber training and best practices elsewhere in the region on countering the PRC's cyber-attacks and information operations.

8. Key Finding: U.S. and Taiwanese forces do not currently plan or operate in an integrated manner.

In the absence of coordinated planning, the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries will be less effective in maximizing the impact of U.S. arms sale, training, and improving Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. In the event of a crisis, U.S. and Taiwanese military responses would be complicated by the lack of prior deconfliction and familiarity between the two sides.

Recommendation 8: Establish a U.S.-Taiwan Combined Planning Group.

A combined planning group would improve the ability of the United States to understand Taiwan's defense needs and build familiarity between the two militaries. Standing up this type of liaison group prior to any crisis would allow U.S. and Taiwanese planners to build trust and develop procedures for working together. It would also contribute to deterrence by improving the ability of the United States to provide defense articles to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, enhancing the effectiveness of U.S. arms sales, and demonstrating the vital U.S. interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

9. Key Finding: U.S. bases in the theater should be strengthened against the possibility of a PLA attack.

In the tabletop exercise, the PLA pre-emptively struck U.S. bases in the theater, including in Japan and Guam. The effects of these strikes were limited thanks to posture enhancements built into the game's assumptions, but in order for these benefits to be realized, the Pentagon must adopt a more distributed and resilient regional posture.

Recommendation 9: Harden and distribute U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Congress established the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), in part, to facilitate this objective. Congress should mandate an independent review of Indo-Pacom's stated requirements and OSD's proposed PDI funding thus far, including the extent to which PDI dollars have aligned with Congressional intent. At the same time, Congress should exercise its oversight capabilities to ensure the State Department is prioritizing negotiations over expanded base access with allied and partnered governments and the finalization of new agreements with the Compact of Free Association States. Congress can support this effort through regular member visits to allied and partnered countries and engagement with allied leaders to advocate in support of cooperative arrangements. And to enhance the resiliency of forward positions, Congress should direct the U.S. military to invest in passive defenses, such as hardened fuel depots and other logistics facilities, and reserve supplies and direct the U.S. Air Force to increase resourcing for fielding deployable airbase sets at U.S. bases in theater.

10. Key Finding: Resupplying Taiwan would be difficult in the event of a crisis.

As the Select Committee members who visited Taiwan in February 2023 heard from Taiwanese national security leaders: "you may not be able to swallow a porcupine, but you can starve it." When the PLA invaded Taiwan during the Committee's war game, it cut the island off from most military resupplies and essential economic inputs. The United States could not provide Taiwan with the additional munitions, firepower, or economic aid it needed.

Recommendation 10: Rapidly expand Taiwan's military stockpiles and reduce its economic vulnerability to a CCP blockade.

The United States must not assume that it can resupply Taiwan during a contingency. The time to arm them and help bolster Taiwan's critical infrastructure and access to energy sources is now. Congress should build on the policy changes made in section 5503 of the 2023 NDAA, which increases annual regional contingency stockpile additions to support Taiwan. Congress should also urge the Department of Defense to establish war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) in Taiwan and other forward locations in the theater, reinforcing DoD's authority to transfer supplies to Taiwan and access critical defense materiel across the region

if needed. This WRSA-Taiwan program could resemble the stockpiles maintained by Central Command in Israel.

* * *

The Committee set out to understand the threats to Taiwan and what Congress can do to deter CCP aggression against the island democracy before it is too late. These recommendations are the initial product of that effort. If enacted in the 118th Congress, they would strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend itself and America's ability to aid Taiwan's self-defense. The Committee's goal is peace, not provocation. A war with the People's Republic of China would represent a catastrophic failure of U.S. policy, and the best course is to deter such a war from happening in the first place. The Committee believes these recommendations, if urgently adopted and implemented, can bolster deterrence and promote peace in the Indo-Pacific region.