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June 30, 2025

The Honorable Howard Lutnick  
Secretary of Commerce  
U.S. Department of Commerce  
1401 Constitution Ave NW

Dear Secretary Lutnick,

We are examining significant security concerns regarding OnePlus smartphones. OnePlus is a People's Republic of China (PRC) consumer electronics company domiciled in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, PRC.<sup>1</sup> Major U.S. retailers sell its devices for use on two of our nation's largest wireless networks.<sup>2-5</sup> A recent analysis by a commercial company provided to the Select Committee indicates that these devices may potentially collect and transmit extensive user data—including sensitive personal information—to servers under PRC jurisdiction without explicit user consent.

More recent and detailed technical analysis reviewed by the Committee has further substantiated related potential concerns:

- Within minutes of activation, a OnePlus 12 device transmitted user data to servers hosted on U.S.-based cloud infrastructure but managed by entities controlled by OnePlus, OPPO, and HeyTap. These entities are legally based in Shenzhen, PRC and Singapore, highlighting the potential for foreign access to sensitive U.S. user data.
- Static code analysis identified embedded software within OnePlus firmware appears to be explicitly capable of silently capturing screenshots without user awareness or consent. This intrusive monitoring capability appears to exceed typical device telemetry or debugging and raises significant privacy and security alarms.
- Additionally, encrypted communication initiated by the device's operating system itself—not user-installed applications—appear to establish frequent connections with servers operated by PRC corporations, circumventing user consent and standard security protocols.

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<sup>1</sup> Xinmei Shen, *OnePlus, the Chinese smartphone startup that made a mark in the West*, South China Morning Post (October 2, 2018)

<sup>2</sup> Best Buy, "OnePlus." Best Buy, <https://www.bestbuy.com/site/brands/oneplus/pcmcat1646077047045.c?id=pcmcat1646077047045>.

<sup>3</sup> Amazon, "OnePlus." Amazon.com, <https://www.amazon.com/oneplus/s?k=oneplus>.

<sup>4</sup> T-Mobile, "OnePlus Phone Deals." T-Mobile, <https://www.t-mobile.com/offers/oneplus-phone-deals>.

<sup>5</sup> Verizon, "OnePlus Unlocked Smartphones." Verizon, <https://www.verizon.com/unlocked-smartphones/oneplus/>.

<sup>6</sup> University of Edinburgh. "Android Phones in China Collect More User Data than Those Elsewhere, Study Finds." *Informatics@Edinburgh*, (February 17, 2023)

This is not a one-off report. For example, a 2023 study by researchers from the University of Edinburgh and Trinity College Dublin highlighted major security vulnerabilities in OnePlus phones in the PRC.<sup>6</sup> These devices were found to gather and share extensive user data, including location identifiers, app usage patterns, call and SMS histories, and contact details. Such information was shared without user consent with PRC mobile network operators and third-party entities like Baidu, with no provision for users to opt-out.

Given these compelling potential security concerns, we strongly encourage you to have the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) program conduct an in-depth investigation into the following critical areas:

1. Identification of any user data types collected by OnePlus devices without explicit user consent, including potential transfers of sensitive personal information and screenshots.
2. Verification of the endpoints and ultimate destinations for all data transmitted by OnePlus devices, specifically focusing on connections to PRC corporate infrastructure.
3. Examination of the full extent of data-sharing practices involving entities under direct or indirect influence of the PRC government.
4. Assessment of the compliance practices implemented by OnePlus regarding U.S. data privacy and cybersecurity regulations.
5. Development of specific mitigation strategies and technical safeguards, as necessary, to protect U.S. users, government agencies, and private sector entities from unauthorized data collection and exfiltration.

We appreciate your prompt attention to these critical issues and stand ready to support your investigative efforts in addressing these significant potential security concerns posed by OnePlus smartphones.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar  
Chairman



Raja Krishnamoorthi  
Ranking Member