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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

September 14, 2025

Jason Chao
Vice President
Futurewei Technologies (Huawei R&D USA)
2560 N First St. Suite 200
San Jose, CA 95131
[DELIVERED ELECTRONICALLY]

Dear Mr. Chao,

We write to request information regarding the U.S. operations of Futurewei Technologies, Inc. (Futurewei), its relationship with Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei), and its role in advancing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) technology objectives. This inquiry addresses Futurewei's capture of critical standards organizations to advance Beijing's vision for authoritarian internet control, its problematic engagement with U.S. policy institutions, its collaboration with Huawei on CCP-directed projects like OpenHarmony, and its continued extensive U.S. presence despite federal criminal charges and contracting restrictions. These activities threaten American national security and democratic values by positioning the CCP to displace U.S. leadership and control the internet protocols, operating systems, and foundational technologies that underpin critical infrastructure and worldwide telecommunications networks.

After U.S. government action against Huawei in 2019, public reports indicated the company made only superficial corporate changes to distance itself from Futurewei.¹ Nonetheless, a 2022 Huawei publication referred to Futurewei as "Huawei's American subsidiary."² In 2023 and 2025, filings under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) by PR firms working on behalf of Futurewei described it respectively as "a wholly owned subsidiary of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd, located in Shenzhen, China"³ and as a "U.S. company" that is an "affiliate of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.,"⁴ with Huawei identified as the ultimate foreign principal beneficiary. Indeed, Futurewei's website characterizes its own mission as follows:

Futurewei collaborates extensively with forward-thinking companies worldwide across various domains within the information and communications technology (ICT) industry. Futurewei experts have been actively engaged in standard programs for more than two decades. Futurewei continues to contribute in next

generation ICT standards including wireless and networks. We are actively engaged in open innovation through participation in open-source communities and cultivating an open ecosystem that drives shared success. Our efforts to promote and innovate within open ecosystems include developing open app platforms for ICT systems. These initiatives are part of our ongoing commitment to building a more open and collaborative ICT industry.⁵

However, this public presentation obscures the full scope of Futurewei's activities. Public reporting reveals that Futurewei has systematically advanced Huawei's strategic objectives through international standards bodies and U.S. policy organizations while maintaining deep operational ties to Huawei through proxies like OpenHarmony and Oniro—activities that directly contradict its presentation as an independent U.S. entity and advance Beijing's stated goal of controlling core technologies.

Within standard-setting organizations, Futurewei has placed Huawei-linked personnel in leadership roles to promote proposals that would reshape global internet architecture. For example, the company participates in the International Telecommunication Union's Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Study Group 15 as an Associate member, affiliated with the United States as its designated ITU Member State,⁶ where key roles are held by senior Futurewei researchers with close Huawei ties. According to public sources, a Futurewei vice president and Huawei Fellow chairs ITU-T working groups, while a senior principal engineer at Futurewei leads multiple Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Ethernet standards efforts.⁷

Most notably, Futurewei's Chief Scientist chaired the ITU-T focus group where Huawei's controversial "New Internet Protocol (IP)" proposal was advanced between 2018 and 2020, which sought to replace the Internet's decentralized, end-to-end design—where data flows freely between users around the world—with a vertically integrated, government-controlled network enabling mass surveillance, user tracking, and content censorship; this would effectively allow Beijing to export its model of Internet control globally.⁸ The proposal was widely condemned as "authoritarian" and "dystopian,"⁹ leading to its formal rejection by ITU study groups in 2020.¹⁰ However, rebranded elements have since resurfaced under names like "Polymorphic Networking"¹¹ and "deterministic communications."¹²

Amid mounting U.S. restrictions on Huawei after 2019,¹³ Futurewei aggressively expanded its footprint in policy and industry circles, positioning itself as a proxy to promote and normalize its authoritarian technology and standards in a bid to reshape global tech narratives. For example, in 2020, as Huawei quietly dropped off the Internet Society's membership list, Futurewei joined and immediately participated in an Internet Society event on New IP,¹⁴ where its Chief Scientist—who had previously chaired the ITU-T focus group that advanced the New IP proposal—was provided a platform to defend the controversial proposal against international critiques.¹⁵ By 2022, it had secured a seat on the Society's board of trustees¹⁶ and elevated its status to Platinum-level membership.¹⁷

This pattern extends to the Linux Foundation, where in 2023, Futurewei sponsored a report calling for the open-source community to support breaking the “Duopoly Dominance” of Apple and Google.¹⁸ Then, in 2024, the company helped launch the Linux Foundation’s Open Mobile Hub in an apparent effort to legitimize HarmonyOS Next alongside Android and iOS.¹⁹ Futurewei’s Head of Open Source Strategy also served as a Linux Foundation advisor.²⁰ Notably, both Huawei and Futurewei maintain separate memberships across Linux Foundation entities, including the Linux Foundation AI and Data initiative, which supports the development and adoption of open-source artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data analytics technologies.²¹

This pattern of institutional influence is more alarming when examined alongside Futurewei’s continued close collaboration with Huawei through OpenHarmony, the open-source version of Huawei’s HarmonyOS. HarmonyOS was developed in direct response to Xi Jinping’s 2016 call to “promote major breakthroughs” in “operating systems” as core technologies to be controlled,²² with Beijing’s security apparatus selecting Huawei as its partner and HarmonyOS co-developed with Ministry of Public Security forces as early as 2017.²³ When Huawei donated Harmony code to the OpenAtom Foundation in 2020²⁴—a Chinese NGO overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—it created an open-source structure that allows the technology to enter markets that would otherwise block Huawei while benefiting from free global development.²⁵ This arrangement allows entities like Futurewei to engage with OpenHarmony and subsequently advance Huawei’s technologies in service of Beijing’s strategic objectives while maintaining plausible independence—a strategy that achieved a major milestone with October 2024’s launch of HarmonyOS NEXT, the first operating system developed in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) completely free of Western code.²⁶

Futurewei personnel occupy key positions on OpenHarmony’s Technical Steering Committee (TSC), including one Futurewei Senior Director since 2016 and a Futurewei Senior Vice President from 2021 to 2023, who participates in both the Web3 and Programming Language Technical Support Groups under the TSC.²⁷ Additionally, multiple tech industry reports describe Futurewei’s Vice President of Engineering & Chief Scientist as being responsible for developing HarmonyOS graphics and image processing components in his role at Futurewei.²⁸


Additionally, Futurewei maintains a prominent presence at OpenAtom’s major events, serving as co-organizer and donor to the 2023 OpenAtom Global Open Source Summit²⁹ and contributing CARSMOS, an open-source autonomous driving system, to the foundation.³⁰ At the Eclipse Foundation’s Open Community Experience conference in October 2024, Futurewei’s Director of Open Source Technology Strategy—a former Huawei Santa Clara Director of Technical Business Development from 2015 to 2020³¹—spoke about integrating Futurewei’s web kernel Servo with OpenHarmony and Oniro projects.³² Oniro, a joint initiative between the Eclipse Foundation and OpenAtom, serves as a bridge enabling non-Chinese developers to contribute to OpenHarmony while legitimizing CCP-backed operating system development through European institutional channels.³³

The United States government has expressed significant concerns regarding Futurewei’s relationship with Huawei as detailed in federal criminal proceedings. In 2020 court filings, the

U.S. government charged Futurewei, alongside Huawei and Huawei Device USA, with racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from six U.S. companies, and “repeatedly making material misrepresentations” about illegal business in high-risk jurisdictions such as Iran to U.S. regulators and banks.³⁴ Following these allegations, the U.S. Air Force suspended Futurewei from federal contracting in April 2020, citing “adequate evidence of conduct indicating a lack of business integrity or honesty.”³⁵ This exclusion, issued under federal procurement regulations, bars Futurewei from receiving most federal contracts and financial assistance unless a specific exemption is granted.³⁶

These concerns are amplified by Futurewei’s decade-long strategic positioning within NVIDIA’s Santa Clara headquarters campus. Futurewei held the prime lease on three buildings at 2330 Central Expressway, with NVIDIA subleasing space beneath, before NVIDIA ultimately acquired Futurewei’s leasehold rights and took full control of the site in 2024.³⁷ This co-location provided Futurewei unprecedented access to America’s most advanced semiconductor and AI capabilities—access that becomes deeply concerning given allegations about Futurewei’s approach to obtaining “confidential information” about frontier technology companies in its Silicon Valley neighborhood.³⁸ A 2018 civil complaint alleging Huawei engaged in “enterprise espionage” illustrates how it deploys Futurewei to circumvent restrictions when legitimate access is denied: after Facebook barred Huawei from a closed-door telecommunications summit, the complaint claims Futurewei directed employees to “register using fake U.S. company names” to “infiltrate into the meeting,” then compiled reports that were “transferred to product development, strategies teams and executives in China.”³⁹ The complaint further alleged Futurewei personnel “used consulting work” with U.S. startups to obtain and relay “confidential information” to Futurewei’s Software Business Unit.⁴⁰

NVIDIA Santa Clara Campus: Before vs. After 2024



If Futurewei was used to infiltrate closed-door industry meetings and extract sensitive data through both deception and proximity, then its decade-long embedded presence within NVIDIA’s campus—at the center of U.S. semiconductor and AI development—cannot be

immediately dismissed as incidental. This proximity potentially afforded it daily exposure to proprietary technologies and strategic planning within one of America's most critical innovation hubs. Though Futurewei has since relocated to 2560 N First St. in San Jose, just a ten-minute drive down the road, its continued presence in the heart of Silicon Valley underscores unresolved concerns about how it may still be operating.⁴¹

Those concerns are further magnified by Futurewei's known corporate activities, including securing over 100 U.S. patents since 2020,⁴² and—as outlined above—holding leadership roles in influential institutions like the Internet Society and Linux Foundation while advancing the CCP's strategic technology agenda through open-source development. That level of sustained activity, despite federal contracting bans and export restrictions,⁴³ raises fundamental questions about its funding sources, revenue generation, and the entities that ultimately benefit from its U.S. presence.

This sustained U.S. presence would appear to be possible only because, as Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei acknowledged in a 2019 Global Mail interview, Futurewei exists as “a special case” created specifically because U.S. sanctions apply to work involving Americans—a structure he noted is not “duplicate[d]” elsewhere globally, suggesting Futurewei functions primarily as a vehicle to maintain Huawei's otherwise prohibited U.S. operations.⁴⁴

This continued expansion of influence—particularly through standard-setting organizations and open-source ecosystems—requires transparency regarding Futurewei's operations, financial backing, and true affiliations. This information will also aid in the policy process as Congress considers potential legislation in this space. As a result, please provide documents and information sufficient to answer the following questions no later than **September 28, 2025**:

1. Please provide a comprehensive and current organizational chart illustrating the relationship between Futurewei, Huawei, and any other affiliated entities, including any shared governance structures, personnel, funding streams (financial or in-kind), collaborative research initiatives, and intellectual property or licensing agreements related to OpenHarmony and Oniro.
2. Provide a detailed internal organizational chart for Futurewei, including names and positions of key personnel and board members, clearly outlining its internal governance and operational hierarchy.
3. Please summarize all activities conducted by Futurewei and its affiliated entities within the United States, including the scope, function, and purpose of your U.S.-based revenues, and personnel.
4. Please produce copies of all board meeting minutes and agendas of Futurewei since January 1, 2020, as well as a detailed breakdown of Futurewei's revenues for the past five years.

5. Please produce all documents and communications related to any civil, criminal, administrative, or regulatory proceedings involving Futurewei, Huawei, or their affiliates in any U.S. jurisdiction, including state-level proceedings.
6. Please provide all contracts, non-disclosure agreements, consulting agreements, or memoranda of understanding that were produced in, referenced by, or otherwise related to any such proceedings, particularly those involving U.S.-based technology firms, conference organizers, or standards bodies.
7. Please describe whether Futurewei permits its employees to engage in outside consulting or advisory work while employed, and under what conditions. If permitted, provide all relevant policies, approval procedures, and conflict-of-interest disclosures.
8. Please produce any documentation identifying current or past instances since January 1, 2020 in which Futurewei employees have held dual affiliations with technology organizations, including through formal consulting arrangements, board memberships, or advisory roles. This should include detailed descriptions regarding any affiliations, past or present, between Futurewei or Futurewei personnel and the ITU, the Eclipse Foundation, the Internet Society, the Linux Foundation, and the OpenAtom Foundation.
9. Please produce all documents and correspondence related to Futurewei's selection of its former facility in Santa Clara, CA, and a description of the basis for Futurewei's selection of that specific site. Please describe any collaborations, formal or informal engagements, recruitment efforts from, or other activities involving NVIDIA.
10. Please detail any financial flows, resource transfers, or operational directives to Futurewei or affiliated entities that directly originate from persons or entities based in the PRC, or from entities whose ultimate beneficial ownership is traceable to PRC-based individuals or organizations.
11. Please provide a complete, itemized list of all contracts, agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other formal arrangements entered into by Futurewei or any affiliated entity with any other company or technology organization (e.g. the Eclipse Foundation, the Linux Foundation, or the OpenAtom Foundation) that have been in effect since January 1, 2020, and that relate to research and development, technology collaboration, intellectual property, licensing, strategic partnerships, or other activities relevant to Futurewei's core scientific and technical operations. Include a description of the nature, scope, and terms of the activities or transactions undertaken pursuant to such contracts.
12. Since January 1, 2020, has Futurewei engaged in any activities that have the purpose or effect of benefitting or contributing to non-open-source projects affiliated with Huawei, including but not limited to HarmonyOS, HarmonyOS NEXT, or research, design, or production efforts related to semiconductors or telecommunications equipment? If so, please produce documentation related to such activities and describe the nature of each such activity. In addition, please describe any research or other activities conducted by Futurewei related to artificial intelligence, GPUs, encryption, wireless communication technologies, or 5G/6G technologies.

13. As noted above, Futurewei is “actively engaged in open innovation through participation in open-source communities and cultivating an open ecosystem that drives shared success[,] . . . include[ing] developing open app platforms for ICT systems.”⁴⁵ Please describe all such participation and development activities (whether or not related to ICT systems), including as they related to OpenHarmony and Oniro. Upon information and belief, Futurewei is involved with Huawei’s OpenHarmony and Oniro projects, which are presented as open-source. Please describe all of Futurewei’s open-source efforts (including but not limited to OpenHarmony, Oniro, or OpenAtom-affiliated initiatives), and explain in detail how decisions are made regarding code contributions, architecture design, security audits, and feature integration. Additionally, explain how external stakeholders can independently verify the transparency, integrity, and independence of these processes.
14. Upon information and belief, Futurewei is involved with Huawei’s OpenHarmony and Oniro projects, which are presented as open-source. Please explain in detail how decisions are made regarding code contributions, architecture design, security audits, and feature integration. Additionally, explain how external stakeholders can independently verify the transparency, integrity, and independence of these processes.
15. Please identify and produce all source-code contributions (including commit IDs, dates, authors, and commit messages) made by Futurewei, or any of its affiliated entities or researchers, to the OpenHarmony and Oniro codebases since January 1, 2020. In addition, please produce all internal and external audit reports, security assessments, or technical evaluations of those codebases conducted by or on behalf of Futurewei, along with any findings, remediation actions, and supporting documentation.
16. What types of data, if any, does Futurewei or affiliated entities collect or possess from persons or entities in the United States, including but not limited to data obtained through participation in open-source projects (including OpenHarmony)? If such data is collected or held, please describe how it is collected, stored, processed, transmitted, and shared. Include copies of your data governance policies, privacy protocols, and safeguards, and explain how these policies compare to U.S. and international privacy standards and obligations.
17. Does Futurewei and its affiliated entities comply with any requirements under PRC law, including but not limited to the 2017 National Intelligence Law, Cybersecurity Law, and Data Security Law? Please describe any collaborations, exchanges, or dependencies between Futurewei and participants in the broader OpenHarmony and Oniro ecosystems, including third-party developers, hardware manufacturers, platform integrators, and service providers.

House Resolution 5 delegates to the U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States.⁴⁶

Mr. Zhao
September 14, 2025
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Upon receipt of this letter, please maintain and preserve all hard copy and electronic documents, including electronic communications, related to the subject matter of this letter no later than **September 28, 2025**. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar
Chairman



Raja Krishnamoorthi
Ranking Member

¹ Jane Lanhee Lee, Exclusive: Huawei's U.S. research arm builds separate identity, Reuters (June 24, 2019), <https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/exclusive-huaweis-us-research-arm-builds-separate-identity-idUSKCN1TP2DG/>.

² Huawei IPR Vision and Strategy, Huawei at 41-43 (Aug. 2022), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250710180157/https://www-file.huawei.com/admin/asset/v1/pro/view/ef04123ab2b143c98d9dd00012164dbc.pdf>.

³ U.S. Dep't of Just., Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended, for Registrant Ruder Finn, Inc., No. 6840 (Jan. 9, 2023), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6840-Exhibit-AB-20230109-4.pdf>.

⁴ U.S. Dep't of Just., Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended, for Registrant Sitrick Group, LLC, No. 7593 (May 16, 2025), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/7593-Exhibit-AB-20250516-2.pdf>.

⁵ About Us, Futurewei Techs., <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708124727/https://www.futurewei.com/> (accessed on July 8, 2025).

⁶ Entities by Country: United States, Int'l Telecomm. Union, https://web.archive.org/web/20250708125924/https://www.itu.int/online/mm/scripts/gensel9?_ctryid=1000100445 (accessed on July 8, 2025).

⁷ Biographies: Joint IEEE 802 and ITU-T Study Group 15 workshop "Building Tomorrow's Networks", Int'l Telecomm. Union, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708124503/https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/20180127/Pages/Biographies.aspx> (accessed on July 8, 2025).

⁸ Biographies: ITU Workshop on Net 2030, Int'l Telecomm. Union, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250709155320/https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/20181218/pages/bios.aspx>; Focus Group on Technologies for Network 2030 (FG NET-2030), Int'l Telecomm. Union, <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/focusgroups/net2030/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed on July 8, 2025). This proposal was also pushed to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), *see* Zhe Chen et al., New IP Framework and Protocol for Future Applications, in 2020 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations & Management Symposium (NOMS) 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1109/NOMS47738.2020.9110352>; Richard Li et al., New IP: A Data Packet Framework to Evolve the Internet: Invited Paper, in 2020 IEEE 21st Int'l Conf. on High Performance Switching & Routing (HPSR) 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1109/HPSR48589.2020.9098996>.

⁹ Anna Gross & Madhumita Murgia, China and Huawei Propose Reinvention of the Internet, Fin. Times (Mar. 27, 2020), <https://web.archive.org/web/20221017200751/https://www.ft.com/content/c78be2cf-a1a1-40b1-8ab7-904d7095e0f2>; China's Dystopian "New IP" Plan Shows Need for Renewed US Commitment to Internet Governance, Just Sec. (Apr. 13, 2021), <https://web.archive.org/web/20221017153558/https://www.justsecurity.org/75741/chinas-dystopian-new-ip-plan-shows-need-for-renewed-us-commitment-to-internet-governance/>; RIPE NCC, Contribution to ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector TSAG-C0135, Response to "New IP, Shaping Future Network" Proposal (Feb. 10–14, 2020), https://www.ripe.net/media/documents/RIPE_NCC_TSAG_new_IP.pdf; Alain Durand, New IP, ICANN Office of the Chief Technology Officer (Oct. 27, 2020), <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/octo-017-27oct20-en.pdf>.

¹⁰ Huawei's New IP Proposal: FAQ, Internet Soc'y (2022), <https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2022/huaweis-new-ip-proposal-faq>.

¹¹ China Info. Commc'ns Techs. Grp., Proposal about Adding Description of Requirements Awareness Based on Polymorphic Network Service Data for ITU-T Y-Arch-INRA, ITU-T SG13 Contribution 1180 (Feb. 15, 2021), <https://www.itu.int/md/T17-SG13-C-1180/en>.

¹² China Unicom et al., Proposal for New Work Item: Security Guidelines of Deterministic Communication Services for IMT-2020 Networks and Beyond, ITU-T SG17 Contribution 1161 (Aug. 11, 2021), <https://www.itu.int/md/T17-SG17-C-1161/en>.

¹³ For example, see Export Administration Regulations: Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List, 85 Fed. Reg. 29,849 (May 19, 2020), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/19/2020-10856/export-administration-regulations-amendments-to-general-prohibition-three-foreign-produced-direct>; Covered List Pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, FCC Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau (updated June 4, 2025), <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>; U.S. Dep't of Def., Tranche 2: Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States Pursuant to Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Pub. L. No. 116-283), <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/05/2003091659/-1/-1/0/1260H%20COMPANIES.PDF>; Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,961 (May 21, 2019), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list#page-22963>; Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting With Entities Using Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,665 (July 14, 2020), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/14/2020-15293/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-with-entities-using-certain>; U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Off. of Foreign Assets Control, *Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List* (Dec. 16, 2021), <https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ccmc/nscmiclist.pdf>.

¹⁴ Our Organization Members, Internet Soc'y, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708070217/https://www.internetsociety.org/about-internet-society/organization-members/list/> (last visited Feb. 18, 2020), <https://web.archive.org/web/20200218183806/https://www.internetsociety.org/about-internet-society/organization-members/list/>; Our Organization Members, Internet Soc'y, <https://web.archive.org/web/20200225201905/https://www.internetsociety.org/about-internet-society/organization-members/list/> (last visited Feb. 25, 2020); "New IP" and Global Internet Governance (Int'l Governance Project, Georgia Inst. of Tech., Oct. 2020), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708065018/https://www.internetsociety.org/events/new-ip-and-global-internet-governance/>.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Press Release, Internet Soc'y, Internet Society Announces New Members of Board of Trustees (June 20, 2022), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708065902/https://www.internetsociety.org/news/press-releases/2022/announcing-new-members-of-board-of-trustees/>; Board of Trustees, Internet Soc'y, <https://www.internetsociety.org/board-of-trustees/> (last visited July 8, 2025), <https://www.internetsociety.org/board-of-trustees/>.

¹⁷ Our Organization Members, Internet Soc'y, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708070217/https://www.internetsociety.org/about-internet-society/organization-members/list/> (last visited July 8, 2025).

¹⁸ Press Release, Linux Foundation Research Proposes New Direction for Mobile Industry with Open Source, Linux Found. (Sept. 25, 2023), <https://www.linuxfoundation.org/press/research-proposes-new-direction-for-mobile-industry> (<https://archive.ph/wip/0YGhp>).

¹⁹ Press Release, Linux Foundation Europe Announces Open Mobile Hub to Revolutionise Mobile App Development Efficiency, Linux Found. Eur. (June 11, 2024), <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/linux->

foundation-europe-announces-open-mobile-hub-to-revolutionise-mobile-app-development-efficiency-302168852.html (<https://archive.ph/wip/knN5H>).

²⁰ Leadership, Linux Found., <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708115506/https://www.linuxfoundation.org/research/leadership> (last visited July 8, 2025).

²¹ Members, Linux Found., <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708115239/https://lfaidata.foundation/about/members/> (last visited July 8, 2025).

²² Xi Jinping Emphasizes Accelerating Independent Innovation in Internet and Information Technology and Unrelenting Efforts Toward Building a Cyber Power” [习近平在中共中央政治局第三十六次集体学习时强调 加快推进网络信息技术自主创新 朝着建设网络强国目标不懈努力], Xinhua News Agency [新华社] (Oct. 9, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20250708175223/https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-10/09/content_5116444.htm.

²³ Ministry of Public Security and Alibaba Jointly Develop Police-Use Smartphone; Personal Mode Allows Gaming and Shopping [公安部联合阿里巴巴开发警务专用手机，个人模式可游戏可购物], China Police Daily [人民公安报] (Apr. 29, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20250708180431/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1326146; China Telecommunication Technology Labs Issues First Batch of ‘Domestic Mobile OS’ Certifications [中国泰尔实验室颁发首批“移动终端操作系统国产化”证书], IT Home [IT之家] (Nov. 15, 2022), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708180618/https://www.ithome.com/0/654/020.htm>; Bo'ai County Public Security Bureau Police Communication Terminal Procurement Project Cooperation Agreement [博爱县公安局警通终端采购项目合作协议], Bo'ai County Public Security Bureau [博爱县公安局] (Oct. 11, 2023), <http://web.archive.org/web/20250314011936/https://xinyang.zfcg.henan.gov.cn/cmsweb81e27e/nas/webfile2024//jiaozuo/rootfiles/2023/10/11/62b274ae4e184663959b5e9d758f9662.pdf>.

²⁴ Sunny Cheung, Open-Source Technology and PRC National Strategy: Part I, China Brief (May 10, 2024), <https://jamestown.org/program/open-source-technology-and-prc-national-strategy-part-i/>; Sunny Cheung, Open-Source Technology and PRC National Strategy: Part II, China Brief (May 24, 2024), <https://jamestown.org/program/open-source-technology-and-prc-national-strategy-part-ii/>.

²⁵ A People’s Daily report credits OpenHarmony with providing innovative features critical to the greater HarmonyOS project. See Huawei officially launches the native HarmonyOS [华为正式发布原生鸿蒙系统], People’s Daily [人民日报] (Oct. 24, 2024), https://web.archive.org/web/20250709174915/https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-10/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20241024_4-12.htm.

²⁶ Bai Yu, China Focus: Huawei releases homegrown HarmonyOS NEXT operating system, Xinhua (Oct. 22, 2024), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250709190423/https://english.news.cn/20241022/209d3dffb7e4c8db9000fc3bc85f61b/c.html>.

²⁷ Programming Language TSG [编程语言TSG], OpenHarmony Technical Steering Committee [OpenHarmony 技术指导委员会], <https://www.openharmony.cn/techCommittee/aboutTSG/> (<https://archive.ph/9wJcy>) (accessed on July 8, 2025); Chu Wenjing, LinkedIn, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/wenjingchu/> (accessed on July 8, 2025); Yue Chen, LinkedIn (accessed on July 8, 2025), <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ymote/>.

²⁸ Former Huawei Chief Scientist May Join Samsung? Previously Led Key System Framework of HarmonyOS [前华为首席科学家或入职三星？曾负责鸿蒙OS关键系统框架], Talking About the Digital World (Apr. 13, 2023), https://web.archive.org/web/20250708173430/https://www.sohu.com/a/666484453_100049587; Lu Dong, Biren Tech Co-Founder and Graphics GPU Product Line GM Jiao Guofang Resigns [壁仞科技联合创始人、图形GPU

产品线总经理焦国方离职], Guancha News [观察者网] (Mar. 25, 2023), https://www.guancha.cn/economy/2023_03_25_685571.shtml.

²⁹ Smart Mobility Drives the Future | 2023 Open Atom Global Open Source Summit CARSMOS Open Source Smart Mobility Ecosystem Annual Meeting Set to Launch [智能出行 驱动未来 | 2023开放原子全球开源峰会 CARSMOS开源智能出行生态年会即将启幕], OpenAtom Found. (June 1, 2023), <https://www.openatom.org/journalism/detail/Ilqn0mjTjtbz> (<https://archive.ph/wip/ZxZM4>).

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³¹ Mats Lundgren, LinkedIn (accessed on July 8, 2025), <https://www.linkedin.com/in/matslundgren/>.

³² OpenHarmony Makes Its Debut at European Open Source Conference [OpenHarmony首次亮相欧洲开源会议], Dazhong News [大众新闻] (Oct. 28, 2024), <https://www.163.com/tech/article/JFJK9B3J00099BK0.html> (<https://archive.ph/hSG7z>).

³³ Oniro Project, <https://oniroproject.org/> (accessed July 8, 2025); Membership Prospectus, Oniro Project, <https://oniroproject.org/documents/oniro-prospectus.pdf>.

³⁴ Superseding Indictment, United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 1:18-cr-00457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020); Docket, United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 1:18-cr-00457 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 22, 2018).

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³⁷ Form FWP, Wells Fargo Commercial Mortg. Secs. Inc., SEC Accession No. 0001539497-23-001956, 35-41 (Nov. 17, 2023), <http://pdf.secdatabase.com/1518/0001539497-23-001956.pdf>.

³⁸ Jesse Hong v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 18CV330693 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. filed June 26, 2018) (complaint); Jesse Hong v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 18CV330693 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. filed June 26, 2018) (memorandum in support of demurrer and motion to strike filed Oct. 4, 2018).

³⁹ Jesse Hong v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 18CV330693 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. filed June 26, 2018) (complaint); Jesse Hong v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 18CV330693 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. filed June 26, 2018) (memorandum in support of demurrer and motion to strike filed Oct. 4, 2018).

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ Futurewei’s website listed 2330 Central Expressway as its address through at least January 2021, shifted to 2220 Central Expressway by mid-2021, and most recently updated to 2560 N First St., Suite 200, San Jose as of March 21, 2025. *See* archived versions of Futurewei Techs., Inc., Contact Us (Jan. 16, 2021; Aug. 12, 2021; Jan. 28, 2023; Mar. 21, 2025), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250321074316/https://www.futurewei.com/contact>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20230128090552/https://futurewei.com/index.php/contact-us-other>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210812192246/https://www.futurewei.com/index.php/contact-us-other>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210116112416/https://www.futurewei.com/index.php/contact-us-other>.

⁴² Google Patents, *Search: assignee:Futurewei status:GRANT*, <https://patents.google.com/?assignee=Futurewei&status=GRANT> (accessed July 9, 2025).

⁴³ In May 2019, the U.S. Commerce Department placed Huawei on the Entity List, restricting U.S. companies from providing technology to Huawei without a license—effectively preventing Futurewei, as a U.S. subsidiary, from transferring its research back to its parent company. Prior to these restrictions, the Commerce Department had routinely issued export licenses allowing Futurewei to transfer technology to Huawei in China; however, it has since denied such licenses, including rejecting a January 2019 request for high-speed data-transfer technology. *See* Dan Strumpf & Kate O’Keeffe, U.S. Blocks Some Exports From Huawei’s Silicon Valley Unit, *Wall St. J.* (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-blocks-some-exports-from-huaweis-silicon-valley-unit-11547119803?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAieHjxl9syxCO40_Noel0L6pF6SzqlTuzU67ySdQ4ZFQb_uCB6WzndECKTuoKs%3D&gaa_ts=686da641&gaa_sig=uYmtcTF8QS3BDIZvnLWy7wJgXGigWXJmCoHITE7OvL_FhRrTa0F3n8lPcIDKrELzfTKlptAl5bnnerzCmzNiYw%3D%3D.

⁴⁴ On the Record: Huawei Executives Speak to the Public, Huawei at 2, 3 (July 17, 2019), <https://www-file.huawei.com/-/media/corp/facts/pdf/on-the-record-huawei-executives-speak-to-the-public-volume-iv.pdf>.

⁴⁵ About Us, Futurewei Techs., <https://web.archive.org/web/20250708124727/https://www.futurewei.com/> (accessed on July 8, 2025).

⁴⁶ H. Res. 5, § 4(a), 119th Cong. (2025).